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CERAS AND DELTA, PARIS, AND CEPR 
On the Political Economy of Labor 
Market Flexibility* 
1. Introduction 
Figure 1 plots the rise in unemployment in Europe since 1974. The major 
fact is that European unemployment has been very high for the last 12 
years, say 8-10%, and has no marked tendency to go down.1 
The economic costs of this are very large-the same order of magni- 
tude, as a share in GDP, as the unemployment rate itself.2 It is not 
unreasonable to think that in a country like France or Italy, some 5% of 
GDP have been lost every year for 12 consequent years as a result of 
high unemployment. These losses are similar in magnitude to those 
created by the major destruction in capital stock associated with a war. 
In the face of it, what have governments done? Table 1 reports the 
share of GDP devoted to active labor market measures, i.e., excluding 
unemployment benefits. With the notable exception of Sweden, the 
figures stand around a modest 1% of GDP-this in countries that are 
*DELTA is a joint research unit ENS-EHESS-CNRS. This paper was prepared for the 
NBER Annual Conference on Macroeconomics, Cambridge, USA, March 12-13, 1993. The 
author is grateful to Alberto Alesina, Samuel Bentolila, Fischer Black, Olivier Blanchard, 
Pascal Marianna, and my discussants Andy Atkeson and Bob Solow, as well as seminar 
participants at New York University and Northwestern University for helpful comments 
and suggestions. 
1. Considerable empirical and theoretical research has of course been devoted to the 
European Unemployment problem. The reader can refer to Bean (1993) or Layard et 
al. (1990). 
2. Given that this is a long-run phenomenon, we want to use a neo-classical production 
function while allowing capital to vary. Under constant returns, the yearly output loss 
is therefore of the order of magnitude of the unemployment rate itself, although one 
would want to correct for manpower's quality and labor supply elasticity. Okun's law 
is inappropriate here, because it only makes sense for short-run cyclical variations in 
employment. 
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among the richest in the world. As a measure of comparison, Marshall 
aid amounted to around 3% of GDP in recipient countries. 
Applying a revealed preference logic to this observation, we can con- 
clude that there is not much political concern about persistent unem- 
ployment.3 The present paper tries to understand why this is so. The 
central idea is simple: Given that the unemployed are a minority, politi- 
cal decisions are likely to reflect the interests of the employed rather 
than the unemployed.4 Hence, a prerequisite for a government being 
able to fight unemployment is that it reduces the welfare of the em- 
ployed to a significant extent. Therefore, measures against unemploy- 
ment are politically viable in certain environments but not others. My 
purpose is to identify and characterize these environments. 
The paper is centered around what is perceived to be a key issue in 
3. Another interpretation is that governments fear that they cannot do much about it. See 
Cohen (1988) for a similar view about the rise of conservatism. Sweden, however, 
seems to have fought it successfully, although this has changed in recent years. It is 
telling that few attempts have been made to replicate the Swedish experience in high 
unemployment countries. 
4. This logic is the same as that of the well-known insider-outsider model of wage deter- 
mination (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989). However, the fact that it now works through 
the political system rather than firm-level wage bargaining radically changes the issues 
and the analysis. See Burda (1991) for a dynamic voting model of wage formation at 
the union level. 
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United Kingdom 0.56 
United States 0.25 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 1992. a 1988. 
the debate over European unemployment: that of labor market flexibil- 
ity. If unemployment is due to legal arrangements that limit the firms' 
freedom of choice over employment levels and wages, then getting rid 
of these arrangements is problematic, because they probably benefit the 
employed.5 I first set up a simplified model of the labor market under 
firing costs that gives formal content to this hypothesis. I then show 
that a natural way to avoid this problem is by setting up a two-tier 
system, where "flexible" workers coexist with "rigid" ones. The main 
5. Otherwise, one would not see why such limitations would exist in the first place. It is 
possible to write models where the employed actually lose from such limitations (see 
Atkeson's comment). In partial equilibrium, the employed benefit from firing costs 
simply because they are fired less often, and these costs are typically payments from 
the firm to the worker; also, they are likely to increase their bargaining power. In 
general equilibrium, as long as labor is not the only factor of production, there is scope 
for the employed to increase their welfare at the expense of firm owners, and also at 
the expense of the unemployed. If labor is the only factor of production, it is not 
possible for the employed to increase their welfare at the expense of firms, because 
they eventually get all the surplus from the match. This, however, may not hold under 
imperfect competition. Furthermore, in a "renovating" economy with costly labor real- 
location, there is still scope for the employed to increase their welfare at the expense 
of the unemployed by reducing the turnover rate. Firing costs are the natural way of 
doing so, and it is precisely the mechanism studied in the paper. 
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findings are as follows: First, two-tier systems may indeed generate a 
consensus between the employed and the unemployed over greater 
flexibility. Second, as the stock of flexible workers gradually builds up, 
there is increased political support for further increases in labor market 
flexibility. Two-tier systems may thus be used as an intermediate step 
toward a complete reform of the labor market. Third, the very recogni- 
tion of that by the employed may lead to ex ante rejection of the reform. 
As a result, the reform that is ex ante politically viable may be limited. 
Fourth, one way to solve this problem is to embody in the reform a 
commitment device to postpone further reforms to a sufficiently remote 
date. I show that such a device may be a conversion clause, according to 
which flexible workers must eventually join the rigid labor force. As a 
matter of fact, most determined duration contracts in Europe are associ- 
ated with conversion clauses. Fifth, complementarities are likely to arise 
between the initial flexibility of the labor market and the political sup- 
port to fight unemployment. This is because in a more flexible labor 
market, the employed are more affected by unemployment, both 
through lower wages and higher risk of becoming unemployed.6 In the 
context of two-tier systems, it is shown that this complementarity may 
lead to "multiple equilibria" in the sense that if flexibility is low to start 
with, no two-tier system is politically viable, so that it is impossible for 
the government to implement its reforms. If it is high enough, it is 
possible to increase it and to gradually reach a more flexible outcome. 
Over recent years, politico-economic models have come back into 
fashion, in part because of the influential work of Alesina (1987, 1988). 
This literature has insisted on the possibility of political business cycles 
(PBC) under rational expectations, and on various forms of redistribu- 
tive taxation. The present paper takes a rather different view: Contrary 
to the PBC literature, it considers the problem of persistently high, 
rather than cyclical, unemployment, which is of especial relevance to 
Europe.7 Also, the redistributive aspects in my model are of a special 
kind, because income differentials come from differences in labor mar- 
ket status that are transitory in essence. (The unemployed find jobs, 
and the employed lose them.) The paper is based on my previous work 
on two-tier systems (Saint-Paul, 1991, 1992; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 
1992) and is in the spirit of the analysis of reform design under dynamic 
political constraints developed in Dewatripont and Roland (1992) and 
Roland and Verdier (1993). 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic model, 
6. Of course, this story cannot go all the way through as flexibility increases, because in 
the limit there is no longer unemployment. 
7. See Hibbs (1982) for the empirical analysis of unemployment and other macroeconomic 
issues in the context of the PBC theories. 
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Section 3 discusses the political implications of two-tier systems, Section 
4 uses the experience of Spain as an illustration of the model, Section 
5 discusses the role of complementarities from a theoretical and empiri- 
cal point of view, and Section 6 contains concluding comments. 
2. A Simple Model of the Labor Market 
In this section, I set up the basic model that I will subsequently use to 
analyze the political support for fighting unemployment. It is a simpli- 
fied description of the labor market with particular emphasis on flows, 
in the line of the modern approach developed by Pissarides (1989) and 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989), among others. 
At each instant of time, the hiring rate ht, defined as the flow probabil- 
ity of an unemployed finding a job, is given by: 
ht = m(Ut, Vt)/Ut = g(t), 
where m(., .) is the constant returns matching function, ut is the unem- 
ployment rate, vt is the vacancy rate (in terms of the labor force), and 
0 = v/u and g(0) = m(1, 0). The matching function, which gives the 
total number of hirings as a function of the two inputs in the search 
process, viz., vacancies and unemployment, has been given a lot of 
attention in recent years and is now a standard tool in macroeconomics. 
It only plays a minor role in my model, however. 
Firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks in the following manner: 
With some flow probability they experience a negative shock to their 
product demand such that it is no longer profitable to continue to oper- 
ate.8 They may, however, be prevented from closing due to labor market 
regulations (firing costs). The more "rigid" the labor market, the lower 
is the proportion of firms that will actually close when hit by a shock. 
In addition to that, I assume another source of match dissolution, i.e., 
voluntary quits. These happen with constant exogenous flow probabil- 
ity p. As a result, the rate of job destruction is equal to the sum of the 
quit rate and the firing rate: 
vt = s(F) + p, (1) 
s' < 0, where F is the firing cost. Note that s does not depend on time. 
8. More specifically, I assume, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1992), that there is a flow 
probability 9 of each firm being hit by a "shock." Each time a firm is hit by a shock, 
its marginal product q is drawn from some constant distribution with c.d.f G. Typically 
it is optimal for the firm to close for q < q* ? q* depends negatively on F. The firing 
rate is then s(F) = qrG(q*). 
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If one turns now to labor demand, it is very convenient to use the 
following result established by Pissarides (1989): Under constant returns 
and a fixed flow cost of vacancies, it is optimal for firms to set the 
vacancy rate so that Ot is constant and equal to its steady-state value all 
along the transition path. This in effect tells us that regardless of the 
initial level of unemployment, the hiring rate ht will be constant. 
How does labor market regulation affect ht? Firms set vacancies so as 
to equate the cost of a vacancy with its expected return. The latter is 
equal to the flow probability of filling the vacancy m(u, v)/v times the 
present discounted cash flow of a filled job. This present discounted 
value (PDV) is lower, so the more likely it is that the firm has to keep 
unprofitable workers and/or pay the firing cost when its product is no 
longer demanded. As a result, when the labor market is more rigid, the 
vacancy rate drops so as to induce an increase in the probability of filling 
a vacancy. To restore equilibrium, this increase must be proportional to 
the drop in the PDV of a job. This must be accompanied by more slack 
in the labor market, so that 0 and h drop. Therefore: 
h = h(F),h'< 0. (2) 
In order to keep the analysis simple, I do not go further in explicitat- 
ing the dependence of h on F: One would typically have to compute 
how the shadow cost of labor depends on F, and then to compute its 
impact on the PDV of a job.9 
Eliminating F between Equations (1) and (2) yields a positive relation- 
ship between h and s: 
h = h(s), h' > 0. (3) 
Increasing labor market flexibility therefore involves a trade-off be- 
tween increased firings and increased hirings.10 The key assumption I 
make about this trade-off throughout the paper is that h is concave, i.e., 
h" < 0. That is, the marginal impact on the hiring rate of increasing the 
separation rate decreases as the labor market becomes more flexible. In 
other words, the gains from greater flexibility are larger when the labor 
market is more rigid to start with.1l 
9. See Bertola (1990) and Saint-Paul (1992b) for a formal analysis of how firing costs affect 
the shadow cost of labor in such a setting, and Pissarides (1989) for the impact of the 
shadow cost of labor on vacancy supply. 
10. See Bentolila and Bertola (1990) for a quantitative evaluation of the net impact on 
employment of the two effects. 
11. More generally, it is reasonable to think that h is concave at least over some range. It 
may not, however, be concave everywhere. In that case, the results are valid in the 
zone where it is concave. 
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It is now possible to derive the evolution equation for employment by 
writing that the change in employment equals inflows minus outflows: 
dLldt = h(s) * (N - L) - (s + p) * L, (4) 
where L is total employment, and N is total labor force. Equations (3) 
and (4) summarize the labor demand side of the model. 
In order to analyze the political support for various measures, it is 
necessary to compute the utility function of the different individuals in 
the labor market. I assume that agents are risk neutral (or equivalently 
have access to perfect financial markets) so that the utility function of 
any agent at time t is: 
r+ oc 
Vt = Et (Zu - Et(F))e-r( -tdu. (5) 
In Equation (5), r is the discount rate, zu is income at time u, e is an 
increasing function, and E is a very small number. The term in Et(F) 
describes the resource cost of monitoring a regulated labor market, sup- 
posedly an increasing function of firing costs. Given that E is small, 
Equation (5) defines a lexicographic order: Agents first prefer income 
and then flexibility; of two outcomes, the one that yields the higher 
expected present discounted income is preferred. In case of a tie, the 
one with the lower F is preferred. In the sequel, I will ignore the moni- 
toring cost except when it becomes relevant. 
Let Ve(t) be the utility of being employed at time t and Vu(t) the utility 
of being unemployed. I assume that the employed earn a wage w and 
the unemployed a benefit w < w. Both are assumed constant over time. 
I also assume that voluntary quits are into retirement, which yield no 
income forever. In order to keep the labor force constant, retirements 
are matched by a constant inflow pN of new entrants into the labor 
force. The evolution equations of Ve(t) and Vu(t) can then be derived 
from Equation (5): 
dVe/dt = (r + p + s)Ve - sVu - w (6) 
dVuldt = (r + p + h(s))V, - h(s)Ve - w. (7) 
By eliminating explosive solutions from Equations (6) and (7), it fol- 
lows that Ve and Vu are constant over time and given by: 
(r + p + h(s))w + s (8) 
(r + p)(r + p + s + h(s)) 
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h(s)w + (r + p + s)w 
u (r + p)(r + p + s + h(s)) ( 
We are now in a position to evaluate the political support for labor 
market flexibility. Suppose that the government wants to reduce F for 
all existing and future labor contracts, thus increasing both s and h. Will 
the majority support such a scheme? To answer that question, first 
consider whether the employed would support it. Differentiating Equa- 
tion (8) with respect to s yields: 
(w - w)(h'(s)s - r - p - h(s)) 
avU/as = (10) (r + p)(r + p + s + h(s))2 
Now, the numerator is negative because sh'(s) < h(s) because of con- 
cavity. Therefore, the employed will oppose any increase in labor market flexi- 
bility. This is easy to understand: Given that they are presently 
employed, they put more weight on the increase in the firing rate than 
on the increase in the hiring rate, which enters their utility only through 
the likelihood of becoming unemployed.12 
Turning now to the utility of the unemployed, we find: 
(w - = i()((r + p + s)h'(s) - h(s)) 
(r + p)(r + p + s + h(s))2 
By concavity, the numerator is strictly decreasing in s. It is positive 
for s close enough to zero if h(O)/h'(O) < r + p. It eventually becomes 
negative when s increases beyond su, where sU is defined by h(su)/h'(su) 
- s = r + p. 
Therefore, we see from Equation (11) that the unemployed are likely 
to support the scheme if the labor market is initially rigid enough (s < 
su). In that case the direct gains from higher hirings outweigh the indi- 
rect losses from higher firings. This process has limits, however, be- 
cause higher initial values of s imply lower marginal gains in terms of 
h. Thus, past a certain level of flexibility associated with turnover su, 
the unemployed also oppose any further increase in s. 
12. Intuitively, the loss they incur because of larger labor market flexibility is greater, the 
smaller s is (this can be checked in Equation (10) by assuming, e.g., h(s) = sa, a < 
1). This is because the lower s is, the less likely it is that they will become unemployed. 
This effect is important because it may generate complementarities and multiple equi- 
libria, as discussed later. 
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For completeness, let us also consider the impact of increased flexibil- 
ity on employment. Equation (4) tells us that the steady-state level of 
employment is given by: 
L* = Nh(s)/(p + s + h(s)). (12) 
Differentiating Equation (12) with respect to s yields:13 
aL*a/s = N[(p + s)h'(s) - h(s)]/(p + s + h(s))2. (13) 
The analysis of Equation (13) is formally similar to that of Equation 
(11). Increased flexibility will benefit employment if and only if s E [0, 
Se], with h(se)/h'(se) - se = p. A necessary condition for this interval to 
be nonempty is h(O)/h'(O) < p. Note that these conditions are more 
stringent than those necessary for the unemployed being better off. 
Therefore, the unemployed will support all schemes that increase em- 
ployment.14 
What do I conclude from this section? The main message is that there 
is likely to be a conflict of interest between the employed and the unem- 
ployed. This conflict will harm the political viability of labor market 
flexibility. If the government wants to increase employment through 
greater flexibility, then the unemployed will support that reform, but 
the employed are likely to oppose it. Because the employed are likely 
to be more numerous than the unemployed, the reform will never be 
implemented through majority voting.15 
3. Two-Tier Systems as a Political Implementation Device 
From the previous analysis, it is not surprising that there has been no 
attempt from European governments to increase flexibility in the whole 
labor market. Rather, what governments have tried to implement are 
two-tier systems according to which existing labor contracts are un- 
changed, but the rules of the game are changed for future hires. A 
typical example of this approach is the introduction of determined dura- 
13. Note that the economy would reach the new value of L* only gradually after the 
reform is implemented. 
14. Because of discounting, however, there is more weight on hirings compared to firings 
in their utility function than in the expression for steady-state employment. Conse- 
quently, they are likely to support some schemes that actually reduce employment. 
This is because flows, not stocks, enter people's utility function. 
15. Note: Formally, there is a majority of employed in the initial steady state iff h(s) > 
p + s. 
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tion contracts (DDC) in various European countries. These contracts 
typically last for a short period (six months to two years), and the em- 
ployee can be dismissed at no cost at the end of the contract. Therefore, 
DDC are associated with a substantial reduction in the firing cost16 and, 
therefore, the shadow cost of labor. 
The present section is devoted to the political analysis of such two-tier 
systems. I will consider the reform strategy of a government whose 
goal is to increase employment by increasing labor market flexibility 
(reducing F). The government faces a political constraint in that any 
reform must be preferred to the status quo by majority voting. I will 
not consider the reasons why a mandated government might have this 
priority rather than others;7 nor will I consider all the possible alterna- 
tive reforms or associated timings. In other words, I will make no at- 
tempt to characterize a dynamic voting equilibrium, the existence of 
which we know is problematic.18 Rather, I will confine myself to simple 
strategies and discuss their viability and time consistency. 
I first consider the impact of a once-and-for-all introduction of more 
flexible contracts. I show that there will be consensus over this reform: 
Both the employed and the unemployed will either support it or reject 
it. I then deal with the support-building aspect of the two-tier system 
and the time consistency problem attached to it. It is shown that this 
problem puts limits on the extent of the reforms that can be achieved 
ex ante. Last, I analyze the implications of one type of such limitation, 
i.e., conversion clauses, which specify that temporary contracts can be 
renewed a limited number of times, so that a given hire must be eventu- 
ally converted into a permanent contract. 
16. Alternatively, I could also examine the properties of two-tier wage systems, which 
would sound more natural to a U.S. audience. There is some evidence that flexible 
workers also have lower wages, but it is quite weak. Also, collective agreements tend 
to set wages in terms of skills and seniority regardless of contract duration. Therefore, 
differences in firing costs seem more relevant to the European case than differences 
in wages. Anyway, the analysis of two-tier wage system would probably not be very 
different. 
17. An important issue is why the same democracies that increased firing costs in the 
1970s eventually changed their minds and wanted to reduce them in the 1980s, thus 
implementing two-tier systems. This is clearly compatible with the model, because 
both a reduction in s in a one-tier system and an increase in s for flexible workers in 
a two-tier system are favored by the employed. However, the model offers no clue 
with respect to the particular timing of these reforms. A complex set of factors, includ- 
ing increased foreign competition and changes in popular attitudes toward unions, 
are probably at work. Another puzzle is why firing costs became so central in the 
debate, because their role as a key culprit in high unemployment is far from clear (see 
Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). 
18. See, e.g., Piketty (1992). 
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3.1 THE CONSENSUS ROLE OF TWO-TIER SYSTEMS 
Suppose that at time t = 0, the government proposes the following 
reform: It is now allowed to sign new labor contracts that entail a lower 
firing cost, F' < F, while the terms of existing labor contracts are unaf- 
fected. This creates a two-tier system where workers performing the 
same tasks will have different employment security. As a result, the 
separation rate for workers with flexible contracts becomes s' > s, while 
the separation rate for workers with rigid contracts stays equal to s.19 
For simplicity, I assume that the new type of contract has no effect on 
the wage, which stays equal to w.20 
Flexible contracts have a lower shadow marginal cost of labor. As a 
result, all new vacancies will correspond to this type of contract. Old 
contracts will progressively disappear at rate p + s as quits or firings 
occur. The new hiring rate is exactly equal to the one associated with 
flexible contracts:21 
h' = h(s'). (14) 
Again, both 0 and h are equal to their steady-state values from the 
onset. As a result at any time t - 0 the utility of an unemployed is 
determined by: 
19. As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1992), I am assuming that shocks are specific to each 
job/worker pair. Therefore, given constant returns, the introduction of flexible labor 
contracts does not affect the shadow marginal cost of labor for rigid labor contracts, 
nor does it affect the marginal product of labor for these matches. A more complex 
setting is considered in Saint-Paul (1991), Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), and Rebitzer 
and Taylor (1991). There it is shown that the "flexible tier" of employment created by 
DDC will be used by firms at the margin to accommodate fluctuations in product 
demand, provided these are not too large. As a result, even though old contracts may 
coexist with DDC, the marginal shadow cost of labor in those firms that use them will 
be the one associated with DDC. Flexible labor contracts therefore reduce the marginal 
cost of labor by much more than the average cost of labor: The effect is the same as 
if all contracts had been converted into flexible ones. 
20. See Bentolila and Dolado (1992) for an empirical analysis of the effect of the introduc- 
tion of temporary contracts on wage formation. 
21. The stock of old contracts neither affects the marginal value of new vacancies nor the 
nature of the input in the matching function. (Because those who hold rigid contracts 
would be worse-off with a flexible one, they will not look for a job. Hence, only the 
unemployed look for a job.) At any time t, the stock of remaining rigid contracts 
affects the total stock of unemployed looking for jobs. But the great beauty of this 
model is that although the stock of unemployed is a state variable, under constant 
returns it does not affect flow rates: This is because only labor market tightness Ot = 
Vt/ut enters in the firm's value function. Because vt is nonpredetermined, if vt is the 
saddle-path value associated with ut, then kvt is the value associated with kut; hence, 
the irrelevance of state variables for flow rates and value functions. As a result, all 
flow rates are determined by their steady-state value under F' from t = 0 on. 
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h(s')w + (r + p + s')w 
(r + p)(r + p + s' + h(s'))' 
By the same token, the utility of a worker holding a flexible contract 
is: 
(r + p + h(s'))w + s'w 
ef (r + p)(r + p + s' + h(s'))' (16) 
Now for the reform to be passed at time t = 0, it has to increase the 
utility of the employed, who all hold rigid contracts at that time. After 
t = 0, the utility associated with holding a rigid contract evolves ac- 
cording to: 
dVer/dt = (r + p + s)Ve - sVu - w. (17) 
The only difference between Equations (17) and (6) is that V' appears 
instead of Vu: The holders of rigid contracts now recognize that if they 
become unemployed, their next job will be on a flexible contract. By 
contrast, s is the same in Equations (17) and (6): Contrary to the one-tier 
reform considered in the previous section, the firing rate is unaffected 
for those hired before t = 0. 
Given that V' is constant from t = 0 on, elimination of explosive 
solutions from Equation (17) yields: 
w + sV' 
Ver = = Constant = V0. (18) er 
r+p+s 
The consensus virtues of two-tier systems are now apparent from 
Equation (18): Because Ve = (w + sVu)/(r + p + s), V', > Ve if and only 
if Vu > Vu. Therefore, there will be unanimity among labor market 
participants over the reform. From the previous section's analysis, we 
can conclude that if s < su, there exists a range of values of s' > s such 
that the two-tier system will pass majority voting. This range is given 
by the interval [s, s(s)], where s > s, is the maximum value of s' such 
that V', Vu. If one confronts Equations (15) and (9), it is apparent that 
s is solution to: 
h(s)/(r + p + s) = h(s)/(r + p + s), (19) 
s is decreasing in s and crosses the 45-degree line at s = su. 
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The intuition behind the consensus result is simple: The employed 
enjoy the best of both worlds because they benefit from the high job 
protection associated with the old contracts, and they know that if they 
become unemployed, they will gain from the higher probability of find- 
ing a job associated with the new contracts. 
3.2 TWO-TIER CONTRACTS AS A SUPPORT-BUILDING DEVICE AND THE 
ASSOCIATED TIME-CONSISTENCY PROBLEM 
In the preceding discussion, I have neglected an important aspect of 
the two-tier system. As time passes, the stock of rigid contracts gradu- 
ally erodes. After some date t*, those who hold rigid contracts will no 
longer be a majority in the labor force. At that date the government will 
have built a political support-essentially a coalition of unemployed 
and flexible workers-for further reforms toward more flexibility. For 
example, a majority is now in favor of converting all existing rigid con- 
tracts into flexible ones. This is because this reform does not affect the 
expected PDV of income streams of the unemployed and those workers 
on flexible contracts, but reduces enforcement costs as represented by 
the term in Et(F) in Equation (5).22 Therefore, at t* the government will 
have exactly implemented the reform that was deemed impossible in 
the previous section: the conversion of all contracts into more flexible 
ones with lower firing costs. This is because the two-tier system, by 
making the reform more gradual, creates a transitional phase during which 
the political support in favor of flexibility is progressively built up. 
Given that the government's objective is to increase labor market flex- 
ibility, I assume that it will indeed propose this reform as of t*, The 
problem is now that the mere recognition of that incentive by holders of rigid 
contracts may lead them to oppose the reform ex ante. In other words, the 
solution derived in the previous subsection is time-inconsistent. 
The question, therefore, is the following: Suppose that at t = 0 the 
employed fully anticipate that at some future date t* they will be a 
minority and that their privileges will be eliminated. Under what condi- 
tions will they nevertheless support the two-tier system at t = O? 
This question can be answered using the model. Those employed at 
t = 0 are likely to lose from the reform after t = t* and to benefit from 
it between 0 and t*. For the scheme to be politically viable, the benefits 
must outweigh the costs. The benefits will be larger, the larger t* (the 
slower the transition), the higher s (the more the employed are exposed 
to unemployment), and the higher V' - Vu. Because a higher s is itself 
22. I have assumed that the F entering this term is the average in the economy. Therefore, 
getting rid of permanent contracts will lower it. 
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associated with a lower t*, and, past a certain level, a lower V' - Vu, 
the reform will be viable for intermediate values of s. 
Let us now consider these issues from a formal point of view. Assume 
flexible contracts are introduced at t = 0. First, consider the pace at 
which the stock of rigid contracts will go down. If Lrt is the number of 
employees with rigid contracts at some t > 0, then 
dLrtldt = 
-(p + s)Lrt. (20) 
Equation (20) tells us that because no new rigid contracts are signed, 
the stock of rigid contracts goes down at a rate equal to the correspond- 
ing separation rate. Assuming the economy is in steady state before 
t = 0, according to Equation (12) one must have LrO = Nh(s)/(p + s + 
h(s)). Therefore, from Equation (20): 
_ Nh(s)t Lrt = +h(s) e(p+s)t (21) p + s + h(s) 
The critical time t* is the one after which rigid employees are a minor- 
ity, i.e., L* = N/2. From Equation (21) one then has: 
t* = [Log 2 + Log h(s) - Log(p + s + h(s))]/(p + s). (22) 
Controlling for initial employment (i.e., the numerator of Equation 
[22]), a higher s implies a lower value of t*: The transition is more rapid 
when the labor market is more flexible initially. 
I now turn to the computation of the employed's initial utility. At t* 
all contracts are converted into flexible ones. The corresponding utility 
of being employed is therefore V' = Vf as defined by Equation (16). 
This defines the terminal condition for Equation (17): 
Ver(t*) = Vef. (23) 
Integrating Equation (17), one can then simply compute Vr for any 
time 0 < t tt*: 
Ver(t) = Vef-e(r+p+s)(t*-t) + V(l -e -(r+p+s)(t -t)) (24) 
Equation (23) must be substituted for Equation (18) when complete 
reform occurs at t*. It is easy to interpret: The value of holding a rigid 
job is a weighted average of the value of holding a flexible job and the 
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value Vx of a rigid contract in a world where complete reform never 
occurs. (In that case, one is back to Equation [18].) The weight on Vx is 
larger the longer the time to elapse before complete reform. 
When will the two-tier system pass majority voting at t = O? When- 
ever V'r(0) > Ve, where Ve is defined by Equation (8). We know from 
Section 2 that Ve > Ve and from the previous subsection that Vx > Ve. 
Therefore, the inequality Ver(O) > Ve is likely to be satisfied if the 
weight on Vl is large (t* is large), or (V' - Ve) is large compared to 
(Ve - Velf). 
Formally, the condition that Vr(0O) > Ve can be written: 
w + sV 
Vl e-(r+p+s)t* + (1 _ e-(r+p+s)t*)> V (25) ef(r + p + s> e, 
where Ve, Vf and V' are defined by Equations (8), (16), and (15), respec- 
tively. Note that Equation (25) ceases to be satisfied when s goes to 0, 
because when s = 0, Vl = Ve. Similarly, when s becomes large, Equa- 
tion (25) is not satisfied because the LHS converges to V', which is less 
than Ve. 
If one substitutes Equations (8), (15), and (16) into (25), it is possible 
to obtain (after some computations) the political viability condition: 
s[(r + p s)h(s') - (r + p + s')h(s)]/(s' - s) 
> (r + p)(r + p + s + h(s))e-(r+P+s)t*. (26) 
Equation (26) defines, for a given initial s, a range of values of s' that 
are politically implementable as a two-tier system at t = 0. 
Equation (26) has a number of interesting properties: 
PROPERTY 1: The LHS of Equation (26) is decreasing in s'. 
Proof. Compute the derivative and use the concavity of h(-). L 
Given that s' does not intervene in the RHS of Equation (26), Property 
1 implies that for each value of s, there will be a maximum level of 
flexibility, associated with some s' = s(s), which is politically imple- 
mentable as a two-tier system. 
PROPERTY 2: s(s) < s(s) 
Proof. At s' = s(s) the LHS of Equation (26) is equal to zero, because 
of Equation (19). Therefore, Equation (26) cannot hold. D 
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Property 2 tells us that the amount of flexibility that can be imple- 
mented is lower when the employed recognize that there will be further 
reforms at t = t*. Therefore, the cost of the time-consistency problem is that 
it reduces the amount of flexibility that the government can implement through 
a two-tier system. 
Figure 2 illustrates the basic intuition behind Property 2 by plotting 
the gain to rigid workers generated by the reform ((V' - Ve) (1 - 
exp(-(r + p + s) t*)) against the losses ((V, - Vf) exp(-(r + p + s)t*)). 
Because the losses come from higher firings and the gains from higher 
hirings, the concavity of h essentially implies that the losses rise faster 
than the gains and eventually outweigh them. In the case of the previ- 
ous section, the loss is zero. As t* decreases, the maximum s goes down 
because the loss curve shifts upwards, and the gain curve downwards. 
PROPERTY 3: There exists some s+ < su such that no two-tier system 
with s' > s is politically implementable if s > s+. 
Proof. This is a corollary of Property 2 and of the fact that s(su) 
= 
. - 
Property 3 is essentially another aspect of the limits to reform imposed 
by the time-consistency problem. 
Figure 2: GAINS AND LOSSES TO THE EMPLOYED OF A TWO-TIER 
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PROPERTY 4: There exists some value of initial flexibility s, denoted s-, 
such that no two-tier system with s' > s is politically viable if s is 
below s-. 
Proof. First note that the RHS of Equation (26) is bounded away from 
zero when s varies between 0 and some finite value. Second, note that 
the differentiability of h(s) implies that the LHS is well defined at s' = 
s and equal to: s((r + p + s)h'(s) - h(s)). This can be made arbitrarily 
small when s goes to 0. D 
The intuition behind Property 4 is that when the labor market is quite 
rigid to start with, the employed are so protected against unemploy- 
ment that it is impossible to compensate them for the collapse of rigid 
contracts at t = t*: The increase in the unemployed's utility generated 
by the two-tier system has only a very small effect on the employed's 
utility, because they heavily discount the possibility of being unem- 
ployed. 
Consequently, if the labor market is initially very rigid, the economy may 
be stuck at a "bad" equilibrium such that no reform is politically viable. 
This phenomenon is also due to the time consistency problem: If the 
government could commit on the value of t*, the RHS of Equation (26) 
could be made arbitrarily small in order to implement any reform such 
that s' c s(s). In that case, one is essentially back to the analysis of the 
previous subsection. 
To say more about the viability condition, it is necessary to specialize 
the assumptions about h. Figure 3 plots the numerical values of the s 
function associated with the following quadratic hiring function:23 
h(s) = 0.1 + 5s - 0.1s2. 
The coefficients of h imply, for realistic firing rates, hiring rates of the 
same order of magnitude as observed in reality (see Burda and Wyplosz, 
1990).24 For a two-tier system to be viable, the initial firing rate must be 
between 0.18 and 0.43. These restrictions illustrate the magnitude of 
the time-consistency problem: In the absence of this problem, the corre- 
sponding interval is [0, su]. The value of su associated with this set of 
parameters is 2. 
The previous analysis is consistent with the real-world observation 
that at the time temporary contracts are implemented, they are subject 
23. In the quadratic case, s has a closed-form solution. 
24. Figure 3 was simulated with p = 0.05, r = 0.05. Note that neither w nor w enter in 
Equation (26). 
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Figure 3: MAXIMUM LEVEL OF THE NEW FIRING RATE AS A FUNCTION 
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to various forms of limitations on applicability, renewal, firm size, or 
worker types. These clauses are equivalent, in terms of the previous 
analysis, to reducing s. They reflect the limits that ex ante recognition 
of future reforms puts on current reforms. 
3.3 THE POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONVERSION CLAUSES 
One such limit that has been used in practice and can be analyzed with 
the present model is a "conversion clause" (CC), which specifies that a 
temporary contract can be renewed only a limited amount of times. A 
temporary hire must therefore be eventually converted into a perma- 
nent one. Such a clause has obvious problems of enforcement, because 
there is an incentive to fire a temporary worker at the time his contract 
has to be converted, to replace him with a newly hired one. I will 
nevertheless abstract from this issue in the sequel. The main questions 
I am interested in are the following: How do conversion clauses affect 
the dynamics of support for further reforms after the system is imple- 
mented, and do they increase the range of reforms that are ex ante 
politically viable? 
CCs can be formally added to the model by assuming that there is a 
constant flow probability IL per unit of time that a temporary contract 
be turned into a permanent one. When p- = 0, there is no conversion 
clause, so that one is back to the previous subsection. When pL = + o, 
conversion is instantaneous, and this is equivalent to no reform at all. 
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CCs modify the earlier analysis in several respects, all of which have 
important political implications. Before we spell out these implications, 
we should first note that conversions increase the shadow cost of labor, 
so that the hiring rate h is now: 
ht = (s, s', p), (27) 
where s is the firing rate associated with rigid contracts and s' > s the 
firing rate associated with flexible ones. In Equation (27) one has h' > 
0, h' > 0, and h3 < 0, with f/(s, s', 0) = h(s') and ti(s, s', +oo) = h(s). 
A convenient specification for f is the weighted average one: 
fi(s, s', i) = (h(s) + Xh(s'))/(i + X), (28) 
which I will use later. I now turn to the main effects of CCs. 
First, the stock of employees in rigid contracts goes down more slowly 
under CCs and no longer goes asymptotically to zero, because there 
is a continuous inflow of new rigid contracts caused by conversions. 
Specifically, the joint dynamics of the stock of permanent employees Lr 
and of temporary employees Lf are given by: 
dLrldt = 
-(p + s)Lr + ,ILf (29) 
dLf/dt = fi(N - (Lf + Lr)) - (1J + p + s')Lf. (30) 
Obviously, the higher .L is, the more slowly will Lr decline and the 
higher its asymptotic value will be. A necessary condition for the gov- 
ernment to be able to implement the transition toward a fully flexible 
labor market is that rigid workers become a minority after some critical 
time t*. Therefore, as long as rigid workers are a majority initially, there 
exists a maximum value of ,L beyond which the holders of rigid contracts 
actually never become a minority. This value is the one such that the 
long-run level of Lr is just equal to N/2. According to Equations (29) 
and (30), this long-run level is given by: 
Lr = tL Nl((RJ + p + s)ti + (p + s)(p + p + s')). (31) 
The maximum value of p for rigid workers to eventually lose their 
majority, therefore, is the one that satisfies the following equation: 
(p + s' + i(s, s', )))(s + p) I, I 
p. h (S s p)-p-s 
= J 
majS, S' ). (Jz) 
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Second, the incentives for holders of flexible contracts to support a 
suppression of rigid contracts at t = t* are quite different from the 
previous case. In the preceding subsection, holders of flexible labor 
contracts were essentially indifferent about it, because it affected neither 
their hiring rate nor their firing rate; the only reason why they sup- 
ported it was that it lowered the infinitesimal monitoring cost Et(F). 
Now the story is different: The suppression of rigid contracts is associ- 
ated with both gains and losses for the holders of flexible contracts. The 
losses come from the fact that because of the conversion clause, flexible 
workers have a vested interest in maintaining rigid contracts because 
they expect to get one at some point in the future. The gains come 
from the fact that getting rid of permanent contracts implies a de facto 
suppression of the conversion clause (,u becomes equal to 0), so that 
the shadow marginal cost of labor goes down, which increases the hir- 
ing rate from fi to h(s'). Therefore, it is not obvious at all that the govern- 
ment will be able to pass its reform after t*. 
More formally, flexible workers will support total reform if it gives 
them a higher utility than the status quo. This utility is the one obtained 
by a worker if there are only flexible contracts. It has already been 
computed and is given by: 
(r + p + h(s'))w + s'w 
ef (r + p)(r + p + s' + h(s'))' ) 
Let Vu(t), Vef(t), and Ver(t) be the utility at time t of an unemployed 
worker, a flexible worker, and a rigid worker, respectively. The evolu- 
tion equations of these three variables are: 
0 = w - (r + p + s)Ver(t) + sV,(t) + dVerldt, (33) 
0 = w - (r + p + s' + u) Vef(t) + s'Vu(t) + . Ver(t) + dVefldt, (34) 
0 = - (r + p + I+)Vu(t) + fiVef(t) + dVuldt. (35) 
If at t* flexible workers do not support the conversion of rigid con- 
tracts, nothing changes at that date, and Vef, Ver, and Vu must be equal 
to their steady-state values from t = 0 on.25 From Equations (33)-(35), 
it is possible to compute the steady-state value of Vef: 
_ 
w(r + p + s + Ix)(r + p + ) + (s(r + p + s) + sp) 
ef- (r + p)[(r + p + s)(r + p + s' + I) + h(r + p + s + p,)] 
25. The system (33)-.(35) is clearly unstable. 
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Flexible workers will support total reform at t* if Vef < Vf. After some 
computations using Equations (16) and (36), we see that this is equiva- 
lent to: 
s'(h(s') - th)(r + p + s) + p[s(r + p + h(s') - s'(r + p + f)] 0. (37) 
If one plugs Equation (28) into (37), the condition can be rewritten: 
(r + p + s)(h(s') - h(s)) - X(r + p + h(s'))(s' - s) 
s'h(s) - sh(s') + (r + p)(s' - s) (38) 
= 
sup(S' SI). 
The implications of Equation (38) are as follows. First, there exists a 
maximum level of the conversion clause 
,sup(S, s') beyond which flexible 
workers will prefer the status quo at t*, in which case the transition 
toward full flexibility does not occur. This is easy to understand: At a 
high value of ,, the likelihood to get a permanent contract is high so 
that the losses from suppressing them are large. Second, the numerator 
of Equation (38) may be negative, in which case there will never be 
scope for total reform regardless of the conversion clause. This happens, 
e.g., when k is large; in that case f is close to h(s') so that total reform 
generates little gains in terms of additional hirings. 
The third implication of CCs is that, given that ,u slows the transition 
(assuming it occurs, i.e., pL < Min(,maj, Rsup)), a higher , alleviates the 
time consistency problem analyzed in the previous section: The critical 
time t* at which rigid employees become a minority is more remote, so 
they reap the gains of flexible contracts over a longer time. Therefore, 
a higher [p is likely to increase the range of reforms that are implement- 
able ex ante. The cost of it, obviously, is a loss of flexibility in one 
dimension. In principle, it is possible to compute, for any ([L, s, s'), 
whether the two-tier system is politically viable at t = 0 if total reform 
occurs at t = t*. For this, one has first to compute t* using Equations 
(29) and (30), and then to integrate the system Equations (33)-(35) to 
get the initial value Ver(O), given the terminal conditions at t = t*26 
Because this is analytically tedious, I have used numerical computa- 
tions. The main results from these simulations is that for any (s, s'), a 
two-tier reform with conversion clause is politically viable at t = 0 pro- 
vided p, is larger than some threshold mjin(S, s'). This confirms the 
intuition that CCs act as a commitment device to postpone the shift 
towards further reform; the higher is p., the more viable are reforms ex 
26. These terminal conditions are given by V,,(t*) = V', Ver(t*) = -ef(t*) = Vef. 
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ante. Pmin may be equal to 0 if, as in the previous subsection, the reform 
is ex ante viable without CCs. 
To summarize, under CCs the political viability of the sequence of 
reforms we have considered is subject to three constraints: ex ante ac- 
ceptance of the two-tier system by the employed, reduction of rigid 
workers to a minority in finite time, and support of total reform by 
flexible workers. These three constraints are respectively represented 
by ix >- ILmin, Pl - IALmaj, and x -c xsup. 
In order for one to get a firmer grasp on these constraints, Figures 4 
and 5 plot the three constraints as a function of the reform firing rate 
s' for two values of the initial firing rate s: s = 0.1 and s = 0.2. X was 
chosen equal to 0.4, while all other parameters are the same as in Fig- 
ure 3. 
At s = 0.1, ILmin is always strictly positive, so that no reform is im- 
plementable without CCs. Lpmin is, however, very small, so that only a 
very limited conversion clause makes reforms possible. Also, min is 
decreasing, suggesting that large increases in flexibility are more viable 
than small ones, at least over some range. Also, l,maj is smoothly de- 
creasing with s', while usLup is steeply decreasing with s'. The set of 
viable reforms in the (s', ,L) plane is given by the shaded area in Figure 
4. At s = 0.2, l,min is initially equal to zero. As s' increases, lxmin becomes 
Figure 4: SET OF POLITICALLY VIABLE REFORMS IN THE (s', ,u) SPACE 
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Figure 5: SET OF POLITICALLY VIABLE REFORMS IN THE (s', ,) SPACE 
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increasing, contrary to the previous case. The shapes of Imaj and ,sup 
are qualitatively similar to the previous case. The set of viable reforms 
is again given by the shaded area in Figure 5. 
To conclude, let us now summarize the main findings of this section: 
1. Two-tier systems allow the electorate to eventually increase the flex- 
ibility of the whole labor market by creating a transition phase during 
which the political support of further reforms gradually builds up as 
flexible workers become more numerous. 
2. The fact that this is ex ante recognized by the employed at the time 
they vote on the system creates a time-consistency problem. This 
puts limits on the flexibility of new contracts. 
3. These limits are more stringent when the labor market is very rigid 
initially, because in this case the employed are so protected that they 
benefit very little from the introduction of flexible contracts. 
4. One commitment device to solve this inconsistency problem is to 
have a conversion clause that slows down the erosion of rigid labor 
after the system is introduced. Some reforms that are rejected by the 
majority without a conversion clause can be accepted with a strong 
enough conversion clause. 
5. Flexible workers may reject extension of their contracts to the whole 
labor force because they have a vested interest in maintaining rigid 
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Table 2 SHARE OF TEMPORARY 











United Kingdom 5.4 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 1991. 
contracts because of the conversion clause. As a result, for complete 
reform to be implemented in finite time, the conversion rate must 
not be too large. 
The next section provides evidence on a policy experiment that is of 
particular relevance for the theory outlined previously: the introduction 
of flexible contracts in Spain. 
4. A Case Study: Spain 
Two-tier systems, where temporary contracts coexist with permanent 
ones, are prevalent in most European countries. As apparent in Table 
2, the country that has gone farthest in the adoption of these contracts 
is Spain. In other countries, with the exception of Portugal, flexible 
contracts are only a small fraction of employment. 
I will not deal in great detail with the Spanish experience, referring 
the reader to previous work (Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 1992).27 What we 
are interested in here is the political aspect of these reforms. 
Temporary contracts were essentially introduced in 1984,28 after a de- 
cade of steady decline in employment (Fig. 6). This dramatic decline 
was largely due to the high pace of restructuring experienced by the 
27. The key reference of interest to the specialist is Segura et al. (1991). The Spanish case 
has been analyzed in various other papers, including Bentolila and Dolado (1992) and 
Jimeno and Toharia (1991). 
28. Legally speaking, they were introduced in 1980, but until 1984 their use was limited 
to seasonal jobs and temporary replacement of a permanent worker. 
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Spanish economy in the aftermath of Franco's death;29 in particular most 
job losses were accounted for by the agricultural sector. Another factor 
is that the labor market, quite flexible under Franco, was made very 
rigid in 1976, with the introduction of very large firing costs. Last, oil 
shocks and the recession of the 1980s took their toll. 
At the time of the introduction of flexible labor contracts, the unem- 
ployment rate had reached a staggering 22%. Although labor unions 
were in principle opposed to these contracts, the political conditions for 
implementing them were there. Because of the restructuring nature of 
unemployment, the insiders felt that they were exposed to it because 
of the large rate of job destruction. At the same time, this same aspect 
generated a presumption that flexible labor contracts could have a large 
effect on the hiring rate, because there was scope for many new firms 
to be set up and grow.30 Therefore, the benefit to the employed of these 
contracts was substantial. 
Unions were fully aware, however, that these contracts would gradu- 
ally undermine their support. Although flexible workers had access to 
full union membership after six months, their interests were clearly 
different from those of the incumbent union members. As a result, since 
29. See Bentolila and Blanchard (1990). 
30. As reported by Lorenzo (1992, Fig. 1), the introduction of flexible contracts was pre- 
ceded by a steady rise in the entry and exit rates in manufacturing from 1980 to 1984. 
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those contracts have been introduced, unions have forcefully repeated 
that their ultimate objective was their suppression. In accordance with 
the previous model, it is not surprising that unions obtained some limits 
on the use of these contracts. The major limit that was set was a conver- 
sion clause, according to which temporary contracts could only be re- 
newed up to three years. 
Despite that, after the introduction of these contracts, as much as 95% 
of the flow of new hires was on temporary terms. As a result, the 
share of employment on fixed-term contracts quickly rose to 30% of 
total employment. Because of the conversion clause, this share tended 
to stabilize in the early 1990s.31 These changes occurred amidst a climate 
of booming employment and growth, because of worldwide recovery in 
1986-1989 and entry into the EEC. As shown in Bentolila and Saint-Paul 
(1992), there is a presumption that part of the employment boom is 
explained by flexible labor contracts.32 
The interesting thing about this figure of 30% is that if we add it to 
the large number of unemployed people in Spain, we get a considerable 
mass of people in favor of labor market flexibility. Therefore, one may 
speculate that we are now not far from the critical time t* where further 
reforms can be passed. This is illustrated by this year's heated debate 
between the finance ministry, Carlos Solchaga, and union leaders over 
the reform of the contract system. 
The reform proposed by the government is in line with what the 
model predicts, in the sense that there is now a drive for a homogeniza- 
tion of the whole labor market (i.e., an abandonment of the two-tier 
system) and an increase in its flexibility compared to the permanent 
contract system. Although the reform is still vaguely formulated, the 
government wants to develop part-time work (which is different from 
temporary work, but more flexible than permanent contracts and entails 
no conversion clause), to facilitate the relocation of workers by firms 
into new plants, and considers lowering firing costs through the sup- 
pression of prior administrative approval. As a matter of fact, flexible 
contracts can now be renewed for up to four years instead of three. 
The difference between this reform and the one I have considered 
earlier is that it will leave the labor market in a more rigid state than 
the now prevailing flexible tier of temporary workers. In my view, there 
31. The following back-of-the-envelope computation can be made: A three-year conver- 
sion clause is equivalent to a value of ,L of about 0.3. If one assumes a quit rate p = 
0.05 and a firing rate s = 0.10, the steady-state proportion of temporary workers in 
total employment is given by (p + s)/(I( + p + s) = 0.15/0.45 = 1/3. 
32. We have also shown that the immediate effect of the two-tier system on total employ- 
ment is larger than the long-run effect; thus, employment overshoots its long-run level. 
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are two reasons for this. First, although the unemployed and the flexible 
workers are very numerous, they are not quite a majority, and the 
existing conversion clause prevents this stock from increasing further. 
As a result, the government is seeking some consensus on the issue, 
and for that reason is compelled to give some concessions to the holders 
of rigid contracts. Second, given the conversion clause, it may well be 
the case that flexible workers would also oppose a complete flexibiliza- 
tion of the labor market (i.e., L > ,sup). As a result, institutional unifica- 
tion occurs on the basis of an arrangement that is intermediate between 
temporary and permanent contracts. 
Despite these complications, the Spanish experience is a good illustra- 
tion of the conditions under which a two-tier system is politically im- 
plementable, and of the result that there will be a gradual building of 
support for further increases in labor market flexibility. 
5. On Complementarities: Theory and Evidence 
The earlier analysis has focused on a peculiar type of policy measure, 
i.e., an increase in labor market flexibility through a reduction in firing 
costs. It has, however, pointed to a principle that is more general: that in 
a world where the employed are a majority, there will be more political 
support for fighting unemployment when the employed are more vul- 
nerable to it. This in turn is likely to generate complementarities between 
the economic sphere and the political sphere: the more flexible the labor 
market, the more the employed are exposed to unemployment, and the 
greater the political support to fight it. 
Complementarities naturally arise in the analysis of two-tier systems 
as shown in Figure 3: At least over some range, the maximum level of 
flexibility that is politically implementable is an increasing function of 
the initial level of flexibility. As a result, if the economy starts on the 
left of point A, it will be stuck at a low equilibrium where the very 
malfunctioning of the labor market makes any attempt to reform it polit- 
ically unviable. By contrast, if the economy starts with a flexible enough 
labor market, it could eventually reach-through gradual two-tier re- 
forms-an equilibrium like E where the market is more flexible and 
unemployment possibly lower. 
Complementarities are not limited to these types of measures. Sup- 
pose, e.g., that at t = 0 one votes on direct labor market measures that 
increase the hiring rate. More precisely assume that the hiring rate is 
now h(s) + m, where m is an index of the resources devoted to labor 
market programs, while the PDV of the tax cost to an employed of this 
program is equal to cm. As a result, the value of m that is most preferred 
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by an employed individual is the one that maximizes: 
(r + p + h(s) + m)w + s 
-( V(m) = - cm, (39) (r + p)(r + p + s + h(s) + m) 
where I have made use of Equation (8). It can be checked that V(m) is 
single-peaked in m. Provided there is an interior solution, the optimal 
value of m is the one that satisfies the first-order condition: 
s(w - ) += c. (40) (r + p + s + h(s) + m)2(r + p) 
If the employed are the majority, then Equation (40) in effect defines 
the level of m that will be agreed upon through majority voting. Com- 
plementarities are also apparent from Equation (40). The LHS of Equa- 
tion (40), the marginal value to the employed of an additional unit of 
labor market programs, is increasing in s at least for a range of small 
enough values of s; as a result, the equilibrium amount of resources 
devoted to labor programs will increase with turnover. This is also clear 
from solving Equation (40) in terms of m: 
m = (s(w - w)/(c(r + p)))0.5 - (r + p + s) - h(s). (41) 
Clearly, am/as > 0 for s small enough. 
Turnover is not the only dimension of labor market flexibility that 
creates a link between unemployment and the value of being employed. 
Wage formation is also an important channel. Going back to Equation 
(39), suppose that the real wage w now depends on the degree of labor 
tightness. To simplify assume that w is just a function of the hiring rate: 
w = w(h(s) + m); w' > 0. (42) 
Then the first-order condition Equation (42) must be modified as fol- 
lows: 
s(w- w) 
(r + p)(r + p + s + h(s) + m)2 
(h(s) + m + r + p)w'(h(s) + m) 
(r + p)(r + p + s + h(s)) c (4) 
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It is clear from Equation (43) that the more responsive are wages to 
labor market conditions, the greater is the marginal value to the em- 
ployed of increasing m. If the unemployed are more effective in re- 
ducing wages, the employed will be more in favor of fighting 
unemployment. 
Another channel of complementaries is the distribution of slack and/ 
or turnover rates across sectors and segments of the labor market. As- 
sume the labor market consists of n sectors indexed by i and that 
the firing rate in sector i is si, while the hiring rate is h(s) + m + Ei. 
Then the counterpart to Equation (41) gives us the preferred policy of 
sector i: 
mi = (si(w - w)l(c(r + p)))05 - (r + p + si) - h(si) - ei. (44) 
Because of the single-peakedness of V(m), the policy that will be im- 
plemented will be the median of the preferred m in the whole popula- 
tion. If the unemployment rate is u and the cumulative distribution of 
mi is F, then it will be determined by: 
F(m) = 0.5/(1 - u). (45) 
From Equation (45) we conclude that (1) if the density of m is nonde- 
generate, there will be some incentive to spend more on labor market 
programs when the unemployment rate increases (which was not neces- 
sarily the case with homogenous sectors); and (2) there will be less 
incentive to spend on labor market programs when labor market slack, 
or turnover, is concentrated in a small number of sectors. If, e.g., the 
distribution of Ei is skewed to the right, then there will probably be a 
negative correlation between the dispersion of unemployment rates and 
spending on labor market programs. 
Now, in a more flexible labor market, regional and sectoral dispersion 
of unemployment tends to disappear pretty quickly through mobility 
and retraining. Therefore, an asymmetric shock to unemployment (e.g., 
a negative supply shock) will spread more quickly to the whole econ- 
omy. Again, there will be more political incentives to spend on labor 
market programs in that flexible economy than in a rigid economy when 
unemployment dispersion is more persistent. 
We have thus documented a variety of channels through which a 
better economic functioning of the labor market will generate stronger 
political support for measures against unemployment. Given that the 
economic functioning is itself the product of past political decisions, it 
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is likely that we will observe a grouping of countries into "clubs," some 
of which are doing little about unemployment, with others having a full 
array of measures.33 
EVIDENCE ON COMPLEMENTARITIES 
I now consider two types of evidence about complementarities. First, I 
test whether unemployment matters in political decision making essen- 
tially through its effect on the employed. My test is simple: If this is so, 
there will be more concern about unemployment when the rate of change 
of unemployment is high than when its level is high. This is because 
the current firing rate is much more correlated with the rate of change 
than with the level, and (abstracting from wage issues) it is essentially 
through the firing rate that unemployment affects the employed. So my 
empirical strategy is to correlate some measure of "concern" with the 
level and rate of change of unemployment, and test whether the second, 
rather than the first, is significant. 
I have considered two measures of "concern." First, using a data set 
on elections in OECD countries between 1960 and 1990, I regress an 
indicator of an outcome favorable to the incumbent government on a 
set of economic variables, i.e., the levels and rates of change of unem- 
ployment and inflation.34 
It is clear from Table 3 that only the change in unemployment comes 
in significant. The unemployment rate, in particular, has essentially a 
zero coefficient.35 The coefficient of zero on the level of unemployment 
has strong implications: It means that one cannot reject the hypothesis 
of political hysteresis-after an increase in unemployment, there will be 
no force to bring unemployment back to some natural level through 
political discontent. 
As a second measure of concern, I use satisfaction polls conducted in 
EEC countries since 1973.36 From this I constructed two measures of 
33. This is indeed the picture that emerges if one compares Sweden, with its comprehen- 
sive system of labor market measures (mobility premia, centralized matching, relief 
jobs, solidaristic bargaining), with countries like France or Italy. 
34. The data set is essentially the same as the one used by Alesina and Roubini (1992), 
itself based on Banks (1987) and Alt (1985). The variable used is a dummy equal to 1 
if the outcome is favorable for the incumbent government and 0 if not. I have added 
Iceland and Greece and some more recent outcomes. Dummies for each country and 
each decade were included. The results were unaffected if one drops inflation or its 
change from the regression or adds the growth rate of consumption, output, or real 
wages. 
35. Note also the low explanatory power of inflation. 
36. These polls are reported in the periodical Eurobarometer Trends. Unfortunately, most 
of these polls deal with issues like European unification. The one closest to my needs 
asks people whether they are satisfied with their lives. 
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Table 3 PROBIT AND LOGIT REGRESSIONS FOR ELECTION RESULTS 
(1) (2) 
Estimator PROBIT LOGIT 
U -0.00 0.00 
(-0.35) (0.14) 
AU -0.49 -0.8 
(-3.14) (-3.1) 
II -0.02 -0.04 
(-1.1) (-1.1) 
AIH 0.07 0.13 
(1.8) (1.9) 
Log likelihood - 89.0 - 89.5 
Observations 176 
Number of favorable outcomes 112 
Notes: Dependent variable = 1 if election favorable to incumbent government, 0 if not. U = Unemploy- 
ment rate during election year. AU = unemployment rate during election year minus unemployment 
rate during previous year. I1 = Inflation rate during election year. An = change in inflation rate 
between previous year and election year. 
"happiness": HAPPY (resp. VHAPPY) is the proportion of respondents 
who declare they are "satisfied (resp. very satisfied) with their lives." I 
then estimate "happiness functions" for each country by regressing 
these variables on economic variables: unemployment, the change in 
unemployment, inflation, and the change in the real wage. Despite the 
scarcity of observations, the results are interesting. 
Table 4 reports my preferred specification for the happiness func- 
tions.37 Several remarks can be made. First, the most striking fact is how 
happy people are! The mean of HAPPY is quite high, sometimes above 
90%. Second, the level of unemployment comes in significant with the 
right negative sign only in three small countries: Belgium, The Nether- 
lands, and Ireland.38 In no case does its absolute value exceed 1: An 
37. Because of cultural differences, it is sometimes HAPPY, sometimes VHAPPY that is 
most informative. 
38. The evidence reported in Tables 3 and 4 may seem at variance with some of the 
previous evidence in the large body of empirical evidence on popularity and voting 
functions (for a critical survey, see Lewis-Beck, 1988). Although Dornbusch and Fi- 
scher (1986, ch. 14) recognize that rates of change matter much more than levels, 
some of the estimations reported in Lewis-Beck (1988) imply significant level effects 
of unemployment, contrary to the earlier evidence. Note, however, that a significant 
coefficient of unemployment on popularity is not a priori inconsistent with the "in- 
sider-outsider" view advocated here. If the coefficient is greater than or equal to -1, 
then an increase in unemployment lowers popularity by less than the additional num- 
ber of unemployed. The effect of that drop on the actual outcome of election depends 
in an intricate way on how unemployment is associated with other issues in the voting 
process. In the simple world we consider, where it is the only issue, a coefficient 
Table 4 ESTIMATES OF HAPPINESS FUNCTIONS 
United 
Belgium Denmark Germany France Ireland Italy Netherlands Kingdom 
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additional unemployed person makes at most one person unhappy- 
presumably this person. Third, the coefficient on the change in unem- 
ployment is significantly negative in four cases: France, Italy, Germany, 
and Denmark. These include the three major countries in the sample. 
The coefficient is always greater than -1.5 in all cases, reaching -4 in 
France. Therefore, these results fully confirm those from elections,39 and 
are consistent with the view that it is essentially through the employed's 
welfare that unemployment politically matters. 
The second type of evidence I consider on complementarities is a 
direct test of the hypothesis through a cross-country correlation of some 
measure of the amount of resources devoted to fighting unemployment 
with some indicators of labor market flexibility. 
The two main indicators I use are: 
1. An index of "structural spending" (SS) against unemployment, taken 
as the share of GDP devoted to "active" labor market measures, 
divided by the unemployment rate. 
2. An index of "cyclical spending" (CS), which is just the predicted 
long-run effect on the deficit/GDP ratio of a permanent increase in 
unemployment by one percentage point, from a simple regression 
of deficit on unemployment and an AR1 term. 
The labor market indicators I use are the rate of regional migration 
(MIG), a mismatch indicator for 1979 (MIS), the long-run and short-run 
semi-elasticity of the real wage with respect to unemployment, esti- 
mated from a Phillips curve (SRPC and LRPC), the share of long-term 
unemployment (LTU), an index of regional concentration of unemploy- 
ment (RCON), an index of real wage rigidity in the reduced form of the 
Phillips curve/labor demand system (RWR), an index of the separation 
rate (SEPA), and an index of the share of temporary contracts in the 
economy (TEMP). Complementarities are then documented by examin- 
ing the simple regression coefficient of CS and SS on these variables 
greater than -1 suggests that the employed do not mind at all. Given that they are 
a majority, it is unlikely that the level of unemployment will affect the election out- 
come, even though unemployment is costly in terms of popularity. In other words, 
the findings from popularity functions are not inconsistent with the election outcome 
functions reported in Table 3. As a matter of fact, most of the estimates reported in 
Lewis-Beck are greater than -1. Also it should be noted that most of these specifica- 
tions do not test level vs. rate of change effects and that there is a general lack of 
robustness of popularity and voting functions. 
39. Note also that inflation only matters in the United Kingdom, and that Northern Conti- 
nental Europe is increasingly happy: There is a positive time trend in Denmark, Ger- 
many, and The Netherlands. 
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over the sample of 23 OECD countries. Given that Sweden is an outlier 
(it has a very high value for both CS and SS), I also add a Swedish 
dummy to test for robustness whenever the coefficient is significant. 
Table 5 reports the matrix of these coefficients. 
The evidence that emerges from Table 5 is mixed but tends to support 
the complementarity hypothesis. Whenever the coefficient is signifi- 
cant, it points toward more spending in more flexible countries. The 
only exception to that rule is the share of temporary contracts, sug- 
gesting, in accordance with the earlier analysis, that two-tier systems 
may act as a substitute for other measures in a very rigid country. 
There are only a few variables, however, for which there is evidence 
of complementarities. These are: 
* The regional migration rate MIG (positively correlated with both CS 
and SS, but this is due to Sweden). 
* Long-run wage flexibility in the Phillips curve LRPC (positively corre- 
lated with CS and SS, even if Sweden is controlled for) 
* Short-run wage flexibility in the Phillips curve SRPC (positively corre- 
lated with CS) 
* The share of long-term unemployment LTU (negatively correlated 
with CS and SS, but this tends to disappear when Swedish dummy 
is included). 
Table 5 REGRESSION COEFFICIENT MATRIX 
Dependent variable CS CS SS SS 
Swedish Dummy No Yes No Yes 
MIG 1.47** 1.4 0.19** 0.03 
MIS -0.02 -0.00 
SRPC 1.0** 0.97** 0.04 
LRPC 0.24** 0.20** 0.03** 0.01** 
LTU -0.04* -0.03 -0.004* -0.001 
RCON 0.6 0.13 
SEPA -0.09 -0.00 
RWR -1.9 -1.2 -0.27 -0.12* 
TEMP 0.06 -0.01** 
Notes: Variables defined in text. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
Sources: For CS, OECD Economic Outlook. For SS, MIG, MIS, LTU, RCON, SEPA, and TEMP: OECD 
Employment Outlook. For SRPC, LRPC, and RWR: I use the estimates for AS and AD curves in the 
OECD in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991). 
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An obvious problem is that of reverse causality: Maybe policies are 
exogenous and we just estimate their effect on labor markets. It is diffi- 
cult to evaluate the severity of this problem. Intuitively, it is certainly 
what explains the correlation between long-term unemployment and 
spending. By contrast, it is more doubtful that policies affect real wage 
flexibility so as to generate the observed correlation.40 Insofar as they 
are accommodative, they can well increase real wage rigidity,41 in which 
case the regression coefficients of CS and SS on SRPC and LRPC under- 
estimate the effects of labor market flexibility on the political support to 
fight unemployment. 
Hence, it is essentially through wage formation that complementa- 
rities seem to work. In particular, turnover and concentration do not 
seem to have any impact. 
6. Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
The present paper has concentrated on a limited, although very impor- 
tant in my view, aspect of the political issues of unemployment in 
Europe. Clearly, the politico-economic analysis of persistent unemploy- 
ment encompasses a much broader and richer set of issues. Several 
important factors remain to be analyzed: Why are there not more incen- 
tives to organize the unemployed as a pressure group? Are there con- 
flicts of interest among various subgroups within the unemployed 
(women, the young, the long-term unemployed, etc...)? To what extent 
can the employed collectively raise their bargaining power through the 
political system, and can this generate persistence?42 
The general message of the paper, that there is not much concern 
about unemployment, might seem crazy. After all, don't governments 
lose popularity and elections because of unemployment? Aren't politi- 
cians always talking about "more jobs"? 
The answer is that this may well be true in the short run, when there 
is precisely a close association between rising unemployment and the 
employed's welfare. In the long-run, however, as unemployment stabi- 
lizes at a high level, unemployment ceases to be an issue, as Table 1 as 
well as the evidence in Section 5 makes clear. 
40. See Calmfors (1992) for a critique of the view that labor market measures have in- 
creased wage flexibility in Sweden. 
41. See Calmfors and Horn (1986). 
42. This would occur in a way essentially similar to the insider effect pointed out by 
Blanchard and Summers (1986). 
186 . SAINT-PAUL 
REFERENCES 
Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic policy in a two-party system as a repeated 
game. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
(1988). Macroeconomics and politics. NBER Macroeconomics Annual. 
,and N. Roubini. (1992). Political cycles in OECD economies. Review of 
Economic Studies. 
Alt, J. (1985). Political parties, world demand, and unemployment: Domestic 
and international sources of economic activity. American Political Science 
Review. 
Banks, A. (1987). Political handbook of the world. 
Bean, C. R. (1993). European unemployment: A survey. Journal of Economic 
Literature. 
Bentolila, S., and G. Bertola. (1990). Firing costs and labor demand: How bad 
is Eurosclerosis? Review of Economic Studies 57:381-402. 
, and 0. Blanchard. (1990). Spanish unemployment. Economic Policy. 
, and J. Dolado. (1992). Who are the insiders? Wage-setting and tempo- 
rary contracts in Spanish manufacturing. Mimeo, CEMFI. 
, and G. Saint-Paul. (1992). The macroeconomic impact of flexible labor 
contracts, with an application to Spain. European Economic Review 36:1013- 
1053. 
Bertola, G. (1990). Job security, employment, and wages. European Economic 
Review 34:851-880. 
Blanchard, 0., and P. Diamond. (1989). The Beveridge curve. Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity. 
, and L. Summers. (1986). Hysteresis and the European unemployment 
problem. NBER Macroeconomics Annual. 
Burda, M. (1991). Insider effects and union wage determination. Economica. 
Burda, M., and C. Wyplosz, (1990). Gross labor market flows in Europe: Some 
stylized facts. DELTA Working Paper. 
Calmfors, L. (1992). Lessons from the macroeconomic experience of Sweden. 
Working paper #522, IIES, Stockholm. 
, and H. Horn. (1985). Classical unemployment accommodation policies 
and the adjustment of real wages. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 87:195-212. 
Cohen, D. (1988). What caused the rise of conservatism? A French view. Eco- 
nomic Policy. 
Dewatripont, M., and G. Roland. (1992). Economic reform and dynamic political 
constraints. Review of Economic Studies 59:703-730. 
Dornbusch, R., and S. Fischer. (1986). Macroeconomics. 3rd ed. McGraw Hill. 
Eurobarometer. (1990). Eurobarometer trends. 
Hibbs, D. A. (1982). The political economy of industrial democracy. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard U. Press. 
Jimeno, J., and L. Toharia. (1991). Productivity and wage effects of fixed-term 
employment: Evidence from Spain. Mimeo, U. de Alcala de Henares. 
Layard, R., S. Nickell, and R. Jackman. (1990). Unemployment. Oxford U. Press. 
Lewis-Beck, M. S. (1988). Economics and elections. Ann Arbor, MI: U. of Michigan 
Press. 
Lindbeck, A., and D. Snower. (1989). The insider-outsider theory of employment. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lorenzo, M. J. (1992). Flujos de Entrada y Salidas de Establecimientos en el 
Sector Manufacturero Espafiol. Mimeo. 
Comment 187 
Mortensen, D., and C. Pissarides. (1992). Job creation and job destruction in 
the theory of unemployment. Mimeo. 
Pissarides, C. (1989). Equilibrium unemployment theory. London: Basil Blackwell. 
Piketty, T. (1992). Voting over redistributive tax schedules. Mimeo, DELTA. 
OECD. Economic Outlook, Paris. 
OECD. Employment Outlook, Paris, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992. 
Rebitzer, J., and L. Taylor. (1991). A model of dual labor markets when product 
demand is uncertain. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106:1373-1383. 
Roland, G., and T. Verdier. (1991). Privatization in Eastern Europe: Irreversibil- 
ity and critical mass effects. DELTA working paper #91-21. 
Saint-Paul, G. (1991). Dynamic labor demand with dual labor markets. Economics 
Letters 36:219-222. 
. (1992a). Are the unemployed unemployable? CEPR discussion paper 
#689. 
. (1992b). The high unemployment trap. CEPR discussion paper #670. 
Segura, J., F. Duran, L. Toharia, and S. Bentolila. (1991). Analysis de la Contrata- 
cion Temporal en Espana. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo. 
Comment 
ANDREW ATKESON 
University of Chicago 
Gilles Saint-Paul has built his discussion of the political economy of 
labor market flexibility on the premise that there is a conflict between 
attitudes of the employed and the unemployed toward taxes on the 
termination of employment. His central argument is that taxes on the 
termination of employment are beneficial to the employed because they 
extend the expected duration of existing jobs and are harmful to the 
unemployed because they reduce the probability that the unemployed 
find employment. The critical step in this argument is presented in 
Equation (10) of the paper. In examining this equation, we see that Saint- 
Paul has taken care to model the impact of employment termination 
taxes on the expected duration of employment and unemployment, but 
we also see that he has given no accounting at all of who pays the direct 
cost of the employment termination taxes themselves. 
In this comment, I re-examine the impact of employment termination 
taxes on employment and welfare under the assumption that it is the 
employed who bear the direct cost of the employment termination tax. 
With this assumption, it becomes clear that there is no conflict between 
the employed and unemployed on reducing employment termination 
taxes because any reduction of these taxes necessarily leads to a Pareto 
improvement. Once we view a tax on the termination of employment 
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as a tax on the employment relationship, the intuition for this result is 
quite simple. An employment relationship of any fixed duration is more 
valuable to the parties involved if its termination is not taxed. Thus, as 
long as employer and employee choose the duration of employment to 
maximize the surplus in the employment relationship, the surplus to 
be divided between the parties to the employment relationship must 
rise when employment termination taxes are reduced, even if, in equi- 
librium, employer and employee decide to reduce the duration of em- 
ployment in response to the tax reduction. 
In the remainder of this comment, I present a simple general equilib- 
rium model of the impact of employment termination taxes on welfare 
and employment to illustrate the argument that a reduction of those 
taxes is a Pareto improvement. 
1. The Model 
Consider an infinite horizon economy populated by a continuum of 
agents. Assume that all agents are risk neutral and have discount factor 
R < 1. Agents produce output in the context of matches with existing 
production technologies. Assume that at each date t - 0, a new produc- 
tion technology becomes available. Index the production technologies 
available to agents at date t by T = -oo, ..., -1,0,1,2, . . t. Agents 
begin each period t either matched with an existing technology T < t or 
in the pool of agents searching for a new match with the new technology 
T = t. 
All agents in the search pool at date t draw a match of random quality 
with technology T = t. At the beginning of date t + 1, these agents 
discover the quality of that match. Let the quality of a match be indexed 
by A E {A1, A2, . . ., Al}, with Al < A2 < . . . < AJ. Let F'j be the 
probability that a new match is of quality Aj. Upon discovering the 
quality of their new match, these agents then choose either to accept or 
reject the match. Agents who accept their new match of quality A with 
technology T = t at date t + 1 can produce AGT each period for as many 
periods as they choose to remain with that match, where G > 1 and RG 
< 1. In particular, these agents in new matches may choose to produce 
in period t + 1, quit the match, and return to the search pool in period 
t + 2. Agents who refuse their new match at date t + 1 return to the 
search pool in period t + 2. 
Agents who begin period t in an existing match of quality A with 
technology T < t produce AGT in period t and then choose whether to 
remain with that match or to quit that match and return to the search 
pool at date t + 1. We assume that the government imposes a tax on 
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agents who leave matches. Agents who leave a match in period t are 
taxed FGt+ in period t + 1. For simplicity, I assume that the tax is a 
bureaucratic cost of terminating employment so that no actual tax reve- 
nue is collected. I will discuss later how the results change when the 
tax generates revenue that is rebated to agents in a lump sum fashion. 
We solve the model as follows. Let Vs be the discounted expected 
utility of being in the search pool at date t. It can be shown that Vt = 
VSGt where Vs is the utility of being in the search pool at date 0. Agents 
who accept matches of quality A with technology T at date t = T + 1 
choose the number of periods n - 1 to continue in their match to solve 
n 
max Y Rs-1 GTA + RnGt+n(VS - F). (1) 
n>l s=l 
Let n(A) be the solution to this problem. Agents who accept a match of 
quality A with technology T leave that match after producing at date 7 
+ n(A) and rejoin the search pool at date T + n(A) + 1. If n(A) - 2, 
then n(A) is the largest value of n such that 
A + G"(RG)(V - F) -Gn(Vs- F). (2) 
The left-hand side of Equation (2) is the utility of producing in period 
T + n and then leaving the match to join the search pool in period 7 + 
n + 1. The right-hand side of Equation (2) is the utility of having left 
the match in period T + n - 1 and joining the search pool in period 
T + n. Equation (2) implies that, holding Vs constant, increasing the 
employment termination tax F prolongs matches. We will see later that 
increasing F also decreases Vs, so that this effect persists in general 
equilibrium. 
For agents who drew new matches at date t - 1, define the value of 
discovering at date t that the quality of that match is A as Vt(A) = 
GtV(A), where 
n 
V(A) = max (RG)Vs, max E Rs-1 G-1 A + (RG)(V - F) . (3) 
n>l s=l 
The first term on the right-hand side of Equation (3) is the value of 
refusing the match and rejoining the search pool the next period, while 
the second term is the value of accepting the match and producing the 
optimal number of periods. We finish the solution with the equation 
Vs = RG V(Aj)i. (4) 
J 
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To evaluate the impact of taxes on firing on welfare, we begin with 
the following lemma. 
Lemma 1: Vs declines in F. 
Proof. Define the function T: R -> R by 
T(v) = RG Ea rjmax (RG)v, max Y Rs- G-1Aj + (RG)"(v - F) . D j n>l s=l 
Clearly Vs is a fixed point of T. The function T is continuous, and it 
maps values of v e [A1R/(1 - R), AiRG/(1 - RG)] back into this interval. 
Thus, T has a fixed point on this interval. Furthermore, we show that 
for all values v1 > v2, T(v1) - T(v2) - (RG)2(V1 - v2) as follows. Consider 
the terms that comprise T(v) one at a time. Let TJ(v) be defined 
~- 
~~~n 
TI(v) = RG max (RG)v, max , Rs-1 G -A + (RG)n(v - F) 
n>l s=l 
Assume TJ(vl) = (RG)2vl. By definition TJ(v2) - (RG)2v2. Now assume 
TJ(vl) = RG Rs-1 G-1Aj + (RG)n(vl - F) 
s=1 
where n i is the solution to 
n 




Ti(v2) RG C R- G-1Aj + (RG) n(v2- F). 
s=l 
Because T(v) = Ej rrj T (v), the result holds. Thus, T has slope less than 
one so it has a unique fixed point. Observe that increasing F must 
reduce T(v). Thus, because T has slope less than one, increasing F must 
reduce the fixed point VS.II 
From Lemma 1, we see that the unemployed are in favor of lowering 
employment termination taxes. Given the result in Lemma 1, it is also 
clear from the problem (1) defining n(A) that lowering F must also in- 
crease the welfare of those employed in existing matches. Therefore, 
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the vote to reduce employment termination taxes is unanimous. In con- 
trasting this result with the result in the paper by Saint-Paul, we see that 
he did not subtract the employment termination tax from the welfare of 
the employed. In particular, he defines the welfare of the employed as 
n(A) 
Rs-i GTA + Rn(A) GT+n(A) V. (5) 
s=l 
Because it is true that n(A) increases as we increase F, he is able to get 
the result that the lowering F lowers n(A) and, thus, by his accounting, 
lowers the welfare of the employed as long as Vs does not rise too 
much. 
We can solve for the impact of employment termination taxes on 
employment in the steady state as follows: Let B denote the number of 
agents in the search pool in the steady state. Let m(A) be an indicator 
variable indicating whether agents accept a match of quality A or reject 
such a match. In particular, let m(A) = 0 if agents reject a match of 
quality A and m(A) = 1 otherwise. In the steady state, for all A such 
that m(A) = 1, there will be 7r(A)B agents in matches of quality A with 
technology T at date T + s, for all s = 1, 2, . . . , n(A). In addition, 
there will be Ej j(1 - m(Aj)) B agents who refuse new matches at each 
date. If we normalize the number of agents to 1, we get 
I(_1) 
B = (I + m(A1)n(A)r + E (1 - m (Aj)) rj) 
The number of unemployed in every period is the sum of those in the 
search pool and those who reject new matches: B + Ej Trj (1 - m(Aj))B. 
Through computation, it appears that raising F raises unemployment 
for low values of F and lowers unemployment for high values of F. This 
is because, at F = 0, agents accept all new matches and operate them 
for at least one period. As F rises, low-quality matches quickly become 
unprofitable, so the rate at which new matches are rejected rises 
quickly. As F gets large, only high-quality matches are accepted. Further 
increases in F simply extend the duration of these high-quality matches. 
If we modify this model to have the government collect revenues 
from the employment termination tax and redistribute those revenues 
to all agents in a lump sum fashion, agents attitudes toward lowering 
the employment termination tax change. In particular, in computation 
it appears that agents who are in the search pool or who have recently 
joined matches of a long duration tend to be against lowering the tax 
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on employment termination, while those who are close to leaving their 
current match tend to be in favor of lowering these taxes. This result 
appears to arise from consideration of the incidence of the tax: Those 
who are close to leaving an existing match have a high tax burden in 
present value terms, while those who are unemployed or at the begin- 
ning of a long match have a low tax burden in present value terms. 
2. Conclusion 
In this note, I have examined the impact of employment termination 
taxes on welfare and employment in a general equilibrium model in 
which workers bear the full cost of the tax at the time that the tax is 
paid. In this model, lowering employment termination taxes is a Pareto 
improvement. If one is to build carefully an argument that the employed 
dislike reductions in employment termination taxes, one must consider 
how it is that termination taxes on employment have a large enough 
effect on the division of the surplus of the employment relationship so 
as to deliver more surplus to the worker despite the fact the tax itself 
reduces the total surplus to be divided. I leave such a task to future 
work. 
Comment 
ROBERT M. SOLOW 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
This is a very well thought out paper. It combines three recent trends 
in macroeconomics. The first is the modeling of gross flows in the labor 
market: into and out of employment, unemployment, and the labor 
force. This is unambiguously a good thing. The second is intertemporal- 
equilibrium modeling of unemployment, as if unemployment were a 
sort of occupation. On the whole, this is a bad thing, I think. The third 
is the new sort of political-economic modeling. I have no settled opinion 
about this. The combined exercise is interesting. It is applied to a very 
favorable case, i.e., Spain. How wide its field of applicability will turn 
out to be is anyone's guess. 
The basis of the model is Equation (3), which makes the hiring rate 
a function of the separation rate. This function is assumed to be increas- 
ing and concave. The slope is straightforward. It is assumed that s is a 
decreasing function of firing costs (F) for obvious reasons. Also, h is a 
decreasing function of F because employers know it will be harder to 
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lay off workers if that were to become desirable. Thus, h(s), parametri- 
cally, is increasing. The concavity comes from general reasoning, al- 
though it seems to me that a convex-concave shape is more likely. 
Now think about h(s). There are three sources of separations. (a) 
There are quits: One would expect h to be higher when quits are more 
frequent. (b) There is dynamic reshuffling of jobs as demand shifts be- 
tween industries and regions: Here too hiring and separation should 
rise and fall together. (c) There are business-cycle events as real aggre- 
gate demand varies. Here you would expect h to be lower when s is 
higher. So there is a whole aspect of life to which the model does not 
apply. This suggests that anyone who wants to use the model empiri- 
cally should take cyclical unemployment out of the data. 
The application of the model to two-tier wage systems is neat and 
interesting. It must be an idealized two-tier system because it has the 
obvious implication that it will be favored by the employed if and only 
if it is favored by the unemployed. The intuition is that, in the model, 
the two-tier system does no harm to the employed as long as they 
stay employed. When they become unemployed, they are like other 
unemployed workers, so they will be better off if the generic unem- 
ployed worker is better off. 
When the two-tier system was proposed by U.S. airlines, the Air 
Line Pilots Association (ALPA) opposed it. They were worried about 
eventual control of the union, which corresponds in Saint-Paul's model 
to the creation of a political majority in favor of a competitive labor 
market. 
Spain is probably a good case study for this kind of model. The U.S. 
airline industry is less favorable. Clearly the ALPA feared that low-wage 
workers would eventually become a majority and attack the privileges 
of insiders. So the incumbent insiders bring pressure on employers to 
assimilate low-wage workers in the basic contract. The two-tier system 
may tend to erode and disappear. 
In fact, when United Airlines and American Airlines finally negoti- 
ated two-tier systems with their employees, the contracts called for the 
phasing-out of the system after a stated number of years. This provision 
has the effect of limiting the weight of low-tier employees in the total, 
preserving the influence of the original high-tier workers. In fact, the 
closure date is approaching for American Airlines. It will have to absorb 
the low-tier workers into the high tier, the result being an increase in 
labor costs at a time when the airlines are unprofitable. 
The institution of a two-tier system in a single industry is not the 
same thing as doing it on an economywide basis. But I think the airline 
experience is a warning that the simple political-economy results may 
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not apply. Perhaps this should be interpreted as meaning that the stable 
"inflexible" equilibrium, as Saint-Paul describes it, may be a very com- 
mon case. The process that leads to it will contain a lot of information 
about the dynamics of the labor market. 
The conclusions reached at the end of Section 3 are reasonable. Here, 
too, it would be interesting to consider the sorts of shocks that would 
lead from a "flexible" equilibrium to a "rigid" one. 
Discussion 
Alberto Alesina suggested another labor market reform that may in fact 
be feasible: the reduction of unemployment compensation. He won- 
dered if Saint-Paul had any results concerning this reform. Saint-Paul 
responded that with such a reform it is important to distinguish be- 
tween partial and general equilibrium effects. In the partial equilibrium, 
both the employed and the unemployed would suffer from a decrease 
in unemployment compensation, so everyone would oppose it. In the 
general equilibrium, of course, unemployment compensation is fi- 
nanced by taxes so that the employed may in fact favor a reduction. 
Also, issues of bargaining power arise, and the presence of unemploy- 
ment insurance increases the workers' bargaining power so that they 
may not favor a reduction. Ariel Pakes noted that risk aversion may be 
another reason why reducing unemployment insurance is not a popular 
way of making labor markets more flexible. He quipped that this discus- 
sion reminded him of a remark by Nicholas Kaldor, who said he could 
easily stop the inflation caused by central bankers: Execute them. More 
generally, he wondered if the results of the paper would hold up if 
individuals had concave utility functions. 
Alesina also expressed a concern echoed by others: If the elimination 
of the firing costs can improve welfare, why are the firing costs there 
in the first place? Julio Rotemberg suggested that there may be two 
reasons for the presence of firing costs. First, they may have been insti- 
tuted to allow workers to accumulate general human capital. Alterna- 
tively, and this is consistent with the model, firing costs may have been 
imposed by the workers after they were hired in order to extract rents 
from the firm. But if that is how the workers obtained the firing costs 
in the first place, they are less likely to vote to reduce them now. 
Marty Eichenbaum wondered why the United States is not afflicted 
by the same high unemployment problems as Europe. Saint-Paul re- 
sponded that the U.S. experience fits well with the theory. The United 
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States has a very flexible labor market, and, therefore, there is a great 
deal of political support for fighting unemployment. Eichenbaum then 
asked why the U.S. employed did not support an increase in firing 
costs, particularly during times of recession. Solow suggested that the 
absence of strong trade unions might be part of the explanation. 
David Romer expressed concern that the wrong question is being 
asked about political reform. With 5% of GNP to work with every year, 
it should not be difficult to come up with a number of political reforms 
that would attract a majority of voters. Instead, the real puzzle is why 
people do not vote for things that make them better off. As another 
example, Romer mentioned California water policy. 

